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A PRAGMATIC MODEL OF LEGAL DISPUTATION
Douglas N. Walton*
Deductive and inductive logics have long been recognized as hav-
ing places of importance in modeling the logical structure of legal
argumentation. But as Larry Alexander and Richard Friedman ob-
served in their contributions to this special issue, legal argument is
typically more like the ordinary reasoning used in everyday conversa-
tional exchanges that take place outside courtrooms. This kind of rea-
soning is neither deductive nor inductive; rather it is presumptive in
nature. Presumptive reasoning is based on burden of proof, and un-
like deductive reasoning, it is subject to retraction once new premises
enter into the evidentiary picture in a disputation. Conclusions drawn
by presumptive reasoning are tested out by the asking and answering
of questions in a dialogue. But what kind of logic could be used to
model this type of argumentation? I contend that a new kind of con-
versational logic is needed for this purpose. Conversational logic is
the framework of argumentation needed to evaluate arguments when
two parties reason with each other. Unlike deductive and inductive
logic, the standards of good reasoning used in conversational logic are
based on how an argument was used in the context of a disputation.
In chapter four of their textbook on legal logic, Robert Rodes
and Howard Pospesell venture beyond the formal structure of pro-
positional and predicate logic to teach the textbook user how to ana-
lyze arguments used in the context of a disputation. Their first rule
for conducting a disputation is that it is "not enough for the parties to
bring forward their own arguments. They must answer the arguments
brought forward by their opponents."2 How such a bringing forward
of arguments and answering to arguments should take place is partly a
matter of propositional and predicate logic, but in certain important
respects it goes beyond this semantic framework. It is a matter of how
arguments have been used for some purpose in a context of disputa-
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Winnipeg, and Distinguished Visiting
Research Fellow, Oregon Humanities Center, University of Oregon.
1 ROBERT E. RODES, JR. & HoWARD POSPESEL, PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS: SYM-
BOLIC LOGIC FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS (1997).
2 Id. at 209.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[
don. Can a logician give any useful advice to those involved in legal
disputations on how to use and evaluate arguments correctly in such a
context? It used to be thought not, but now I hope to show that it can
be done.
Much work has already been done in the pragmatics of disputa-
tion, and the problem confronted by this paper will be to see how this
work could be extended to legal argumentation in a North American
perspective. The pragmatic approach to disputation seems to be
more of a European than a North American tradition, and is based
most notably on the works of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-
Tyteca,3 Else M. Barth and Erik C. W. Krabbe,4 Frans van Eemeren
and Rob Grootendorst,5 Robert Alexy,6 and L. Jonathan Cohen.7
However, this approach is also based on the fundamentally important
work of the Australian logician Charles Hamblin 8 on the structure of
formal dialectical systems, the continuing work of his former student
Jim Mackenzie, 9 and on the dialectical logic of plausible reasoning of
Nicholas Rescher. 10 I am not sure whetherJaakko Hintikka counts as
European or North American, but his work on dialogue models of
argumentation, for example, should definitely be cited here as well.11
Finally, the pioneering work of J. Paul Grice 12 on the pragmatic logic
of conversational arguments also needs to be mentioned.
The particular problem of applying this work on disputation to
legal argumentation is that of analyzing the interactive framework of
argument use, which I will call "the fair trial." There are many differ-
3 CHm PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC (John
Wilkenson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969).
4 ELSE M. BARTH & ERIK C.W. KRABBE, FROM AXIOM TO DIALOGUE (1982).
5 FRANS VAN EEMEREN & ROB GROOTENDORST, SPEECH ACTS IN ARGUMENTATIVE
DISCUSSIONS (1984).
6 ROBERT ALExy, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL
DISCOURSE As THEORY OF LEGALJusTiFICATION (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick trans.,
1989).
7 L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977).
8 C.L. HAMBLIN, IMPERATIVES (1987) [hereinafter HAMBLIN, IMPERATIVES]; C.L.
HAMBLIN, FALLACIES (1970) [hereinafter HAMBLIN, FALLACIES]; C.L. Hamblin, Mathe-
matical Models of Dialogues, 37 THEORIA 130 (1971).
9 Jim Mackenzie, Four Dialogue Systems, 49 STUDIA LOGICA 567 (1990); J.D. Mac-
kenzie, The Dialectics of Logic, 94 LOGIQUE ET ANALYSE 159 (1981).
10 NICHOLAS RESCHER, DIALEcrICs: A CONTROVERSY-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (1977); NICHOLAS RESCHER, PLAUSIBLE REASONING (1976)
[hereinafter RESCHER, PLAUSIBLE REASONING].
11 JAAKKo HINTIKKA, THE INTERROGATIVE MODEL OF INQUIRY AS A GENERAL THEORY
OF ARGUMENTATION, COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION (1992).
12 J. Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in THE LOGIC OF GRAMMAR (Donald David-
son & Gilbert Harman eds., 1975).
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ent kinds of legal arguments used for many different purposes on
many different occasions, but the trial is centrally important as a legal
institution. When arguments are used in a trial, whatever specific type
of trial it may be and whatever may be the particular jurisdiction, can
we judge whether such arguments are correct or incorrect with re-
spect to how they have been used as part of the trial procedure? This
question, I hope to show, can be answered affirmatively, if we can
classify the fair trial as a normative model of argumentation that has a
definite goal, and that has argumentation structures that are the
means of realizing that goal.
I. NoRMAnmv MODELS OF ARGUMENTATION
The remarks that follow do not contain a description of disputa-
tion in any actual legal system, or a description of any actual system of
procedural rules for argumentation in dialogue; rather, they provide a
normative model that represents a logical idealization of the proper-
ties that such a system ought to have if it is to achieve its goals in an
efficient way. Such a system makes good use of argumentation, is logi-
cally consistent, and avoids fallacies and other logical difficulties. The
normative model given is much simpler than the real system of law in
any given jurisdiction at any given time. It is a kind of abstraction that
may be taken to represent some features of realistic legal argumenta-
tion in particular respects, but will deviate in other respects from the
argumentation used in real cases. Therefore, it is best to think of it as
an idealized model which represents one view of how legal argumen-
tation ought to be analyzed and evaluated from a logical point of view.
On the other hand, the model is tied to reality to some extent in that
it is based on the kind of reasoning that is used in everyday argumen-
tation, presumably the same kind of reasoning a jury would use when
reaching a decision on how to rule in a particular legal case.
Legal reasoning generally operates on presumptions, meaning
that a proposition is accepted as true, or not accepted as true, on the
basis of whether it is justified or not by other propositions that are
accepted as true. This second class of propositions, the ones that do
the justifying, is called the evidence. Something is evidence if it seems
to be true, if it follows from propositions that seem to be true, or if it
can be tested (by the tests accepted at any given time). This definition
of evidence is a skeptical one, implying that evidence is generally de-
feasible in nature. That is, the weight of evidence in favor of a propo-
sition can be stronger or weaker, but even if it is very strong, it may
later turn out to be defeated by the introduction of new evidence.
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A dispute may arise about whether a particular proposition is true
or not, or should be accepted as true or not. Where the dispute needs
to be resolved and cannot be resolved by any non-judicial means, the
dispute may then go to trial. Central to the fair trial is that there is a
conflict of opinions that should be resolved in a dialogue where both
sides bring forward the strongest evidence to support their conten-
tions. The arguments on both sides are allowed to interact so that
each can criticize the arguments put forward by the other. The basic
idea is that the arguments on both sides should be tested out in a
dialogue where each side brings out the arguments it believes to rep-
resent its strongest evidence supporting its contention. While both
sides should be free to bring out this evidence, the evidence brought
out should be relevant in the sense that it really bears on the issues
contended at the trial. In determining the outcome, the trier (the
judge or jury), who has followed all the argumentation on both sides
throughout the whole trial, can make its decision based upon a bur-
den of proof that was agreed on before the trial started.
The two most important components of legal logic are the con-
cepts of evidence and the fair trial. Both of these ideas are hard to
define because they are vague and subject to interpretation and be-
cause they are constantly being subjected to testing and interpretation
by legal trials and new developments. Therefore, we can have differ-
ent theories or models-oversimplified pictures-of what these things
are or how they should be viewed. These theories are meta-legal con-
structs that represent philosophical interpretations of what the theo-
rist thinks that legal argumentation should ideally be like. Thus, the
theories themselves are subject to dispute. It is particularly tricky to
construct and evaluate a theory of evidence, because what you are us-
ing to evaluate the theory is (presumably) evidence for or against the
theory. But in the case of legal evidence this circularity is not so much
of a problem because the theorist is only trying to give a definition of
a particular kind of evidence-legal evidence-based on considera-
tions of a more general nature that are not exclusively legal, but are
also meta-legal and philosophical.
Before going on to study in depth the concepts of evidence and
the fair trial, we need to outline the types of arguments, or so-called
argumentation schemes, used both in legal argumentation and in eve-
ryday argumentation outside legal contexts. But first, it is necessary to
outline other recent developments in argumentation theory. In the
pragmatic approach to the evaluation of argumentation, arguments
are judged on how they are used in a particular case to contribute to
the goal of the dialogue in which the argument is embedded. That is,
the pragmatic presumption is that for every argument used in a given
[VOL- 73:3
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case, the argument was used by one party as part of a goal-directed
dialogue with another party. In other words, every argument used in
a particular case has a context of use. That context of use is called a
dialogue (or conversation), and the argument needs to be evaluated
with respect to how it was used in the context of the dialogue it was
(supposedly) a part of in the given case.
But what kind of goal-directed structure is a legal disputation?
The kind that is typified by the fair trial? A legal disputation has a
structure that is highly adversarial and is comprised of varied proce-
dural rules to which the participants are bound. To determine what
kind of general structure this might be, we have to turn to an exami-
nation of the types of dialogue that have been studied.
II. TYPES OF DLOuoE
The new pragmatic approach to argument evaluation is called di-
alectical in the ancient Greek sense,' 3 implying that every argument
has a proponent and a respondent who engage in a so-called dia-
logue, or goal-directed type of conversational exchange, in which the
argument is being used by the proponent for some purpose.
Although the two parties are contesting with each other in an ex-
change that is partly adversarial (or agonistic, meaning that they are
struggling with each other to try to be victorious over the other), they
are also supposed to be collaboratively taking part in an orderly ex-
change that requires cooperation and the following of rules, or so-
called maxims of polite discourse. 14 According to the Gricean Coop-
erativeness Principle (CP), each party must make moves that are ap-
propriate for the stage of the dialogue that the conversation is in:
"Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the
talk exchange in which you are engaged."' 5 According to van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, a dialogue of the kind they call a critical
discussion (see below) has four stages: an opening stage; a confronta-
tion stage, where the issue is defined and agreed upon; an argumenta-
tion stage, where the arguments are put forward and criticized by both
sides; and a closing stage.1 6 An argument that is appropriate (correct,
relevant, non-fallacious) at one stage, might be judged quite differ-
enly when it has been used at another stage of a dialogue exchange.
13 See HmLIN, FALLACIES, supra note 8, at 55.
14 See Grice, supra note 12, at 67.
15 Id.
16 See vAN EEMEREN & GRooTENDORsT, supra note 5.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
In other words, it is not just the reasoning used in argumenta-
tion-the chain of valid or invalid inferences in the argument-that is
the whole story of how the argument should be evaluated (as used in a
given case). What is also important is how that chain of reasoning was
used to make some point in the context of a dispute (dialogue). One
can appreciate this pragmatic aspect of argument evaluation by con-
sidering the concept of relevance. An argument that was relevant at
one stage of a dialogue may fail to be relevant at another stage of the
same dialogue. The relevance of an argument in a dialogue is very
much relative to the prior moves in the dialogue to which the argu-
ment was supposed to respond. Relevance is also determined by the
goal of the dialogue. The dialectical nature of such a pragmatic con-
cept of relevance was already indicated in the pioneering account of
conversational argument.1 7 Many of the kinds of argumentation asso-
ciated with traditional fallacies, like the ad hominem argument and vari-
ous appeals to emotions, are in fact arguments that, when they are
fallacious, are so in virtue of a failure to be dialectically relevant.18 In
such instances, the same argument could be relevant in one context
of dialogue, but irrelevant as used in another dialogue. A good exam-
ple is the use of an ad hominem argument to attack an arguer's credibil-
ity. This type of argument can be relevant in some cases, as used in
cross-examination of a witness in a court of law, while in other cases it
is irrelevant.
An important general factor in evaluating arguments pragmati-
cally is that an argument can be quite correct or reasonable as used in
one type of dialogue, but fallacious when used in a different type of
dialogue. In other words, there are different types of dialogue that
can function as contexts for the use of argumentation. According to
the normative framework, there are six basic types of dialogue of this
kind.19 It is not that six is the magic number, or that there can be no
other types of dialogue other than these six. But judging from the
investigation of fallacies and other phenomena pertaining to the eval-
uation of argumentation in everyday conversational exchanges, the
evaluation of an argument generally tends to reduce to a considera-
tion of some combination of a subset of this set of six types of
dialogues.
17 See Grice, supra note 12.
18 See DouGLAs WALTON, A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF FALLACY 16-17 (1995).
19 See id. at 98-129; see also DOUGLAS N. WALTON & ERIK C.W. KRABBE, COMMIT-
MENT IN DIALOGUE 66 (1995).
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TYPES OF DIALOGUE
TYPE OF INITIAL PARTICIPANT'S GOAL OF
DIALOGUE SITUATION GOAL DIALOGUE
Persuasion Conflict of Persuade Other Resolve or
Opinions Party Clarify Issue
Inquiry Need to Have Find and Verify Prove or
Proof Evidence Disprove
Hypothesis
Negotiation Conflict of Get What You Reasonable
Interests Most Want Settlement
Information- One Party Lacks Acquire or Give Exchange
Seeking Information Information Information
Deliberation Dilemma or Co-ordinate Decide Best
Practical Choice Goals and Course of Action
Actions
One has to be careful in using these models of dialogue to be
clear that the goal of the dialogue as a whole is different from the
individual goals of each of the participants in the dialogue. Generally,
the main factor in evaluating any argument is how well it contributes
to the goal of the dialogue as a whole. According to one framework,
an argument as used in a given case is fallacious if it was used in such a
way that it blocks or goes against the goal of the type of dialogue of
which it was supposed to be a part.20 So it is the goal of the dialogue
as a whole that is the uppermost factor in evaluating an argument as
correct or incorrect, weak or strong.
In the first type of dialogue, called the persuasion dialogue, the
one party, called the proponent, has a particular proposition desig-
nated as her thesis, and her goal is to prove this proposition by means
of the kinds of arguments accepted as persuasive in the dialogue. The
goal of the other party can be of two sorts, depending on the type of
critical discussion. In the one type, the respondent's goal is achieved
if he raises enough of the right sort of questions to throw the success
of the proponent's attempted proof into doubt. In the other type, the
respondent's goal is more difficult to achieve. The respondent's goal
is to prove a thesis that is the opposite (negation) of the proponent's
thesis, thereby proving that the proponent's thesis is false. What kinds
of arguments are accepted as persuasive in this type of dialogue gener-
ally? For an arguer's argument to be persuasive, it must have as its
20 See WALTON, supra note 18, at 15.
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conclusion the thesis of the other party, and it must have as premises
only propositions that are commitments of the other party.2 '
The most familiar type of persuasion dialogue is called the critical
discussion by van Eemeren and Grootendorst.22 The goal of the dia-
logue in a critical discussion is to resolve the initial conflict of opin-
ions that is at issue in the dialogue. The critical discussion has eight
rules which can be paraphrased as follows: 23
(1) parties must not prevent each other from advancing
arguments;
(2) an arguer must defend her argument if asked to do so;
(3) an attack on an arguer's position must relate to that position
(and not some other position);
(4) a claim can only be defended by giving relevant arguments
for it;
(5) an arguer can be held to his implicit premises;
(6) an argument must be regarded as conclusively defended if its
conclusion has been inferred by a structurally correct form of
inference from premises that have been accepted by both
parties at the outset of the discussion;
(7) arguments must be valid or be capable of being made valid
by the addition if implicit premises;
(8) formulations must not be unduly vague or ambiguous.
Violations of these rules of collaborative critical discussion are
identified by van Eemeren and Grootendorst with informal fallacies.
For example, committing the ad baculum fallacy would be seen as a
violation of Rule (1), which forbids parties from using force to try to
prevent the other party from advancing arguments. 24
The critical discussion is classified as a subtype of persuasion dia-
logue.25 The main reason is that in a critical discussion the dialogue is
only successful if the conflict of opinions is resolved by showing that
the argumentation of the one party is successful, while that of the
other party is not. But in many instances of persuasion dialogue, for
example in a philosophical discussion of a controversial issue, the dia-
logue can be successful if real light is thrown on the issue for both
participants. In other words, even if the conflict of opinions has not
been resolved, and even if it is not the case that the one party is the
winner and the other is the loser, in many instances of persuasion
21 For more on what commitments are, see text accompanying notes 28-30.
22 VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 5.
23 id. at 184-293.
24 See id.
25 See WALTON, supra note 18, at 100.
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dialogue the dialogue can be successful by showing that the argumen-
tation of the one party is successful while that of the other party is not.
In such a persuasion dialogue, the dialogue can reach its goal if
the maieutic function of giving birth to new ideas has been achieved.
In the maieutic function, probing arguments used in a dialogue ex-
change clarify a participant's commitments and strengthen her argu-
ments. Not only does she see how these arguments need to be refined
and qualified in order to avoid the objections that can be brought
against them by an able opponent, but she also sees the weaknesses in
them.2 6 When the maieutic function is fulfilled, an arguer not only
gains deeper insight into her own commitments, but she also gains
insight into the reasons why the other party is committed to his thesis.
By means of the strong arguments used by both sides in a successful
persuasion dialogue, the positions of both sides are tested out and
refined, even if the issue is not resolved.
To better understand persuasion dialogue, and the other five
types of dialogue, it is necessary to define the concept of an arguer's
commitment. According to Hamblin, each participant in a dialogue
has a set of propositions called a "commitment store," and proposi-
tions are inserted into this store, or deleted from it, as the dialogue
proceeds.27 The idea is that the participant begins with a commit-
ment to proving her thesis in the dialogue, and then as the dialogue
proceeds, and the participant makes a certain type of move, proposi-
tions will be inserted into the store, or deleted from it, in accord with
the type of move. For example, if a participant makes a move assert-
ing the truth of a particular proposition, she then becomes committed
to that proposition at the next move. As the dialogue proceeds, the
commitment store represents a kind of ideal model of the arguer's
position, the collective set of propositions that represent her point of
view or stance on the issue. All six types of dialogue cited here are
organized around the fundamental idea of the commitment store of
the participants. In Hamblin's scheme of things, the commitments of
a participant in a dialogue are always on view to all the participants in
the dialogue, and these commitments strongly influence how the dia-
logue proceeds, and how the aims of the participants are fulfilled or
not.28 Any argument, if it is to be successful, must always be based on
the commitments of the other party.
26 See WALTON & KRABBE, supra note 19.
27 See HAMBLIN, FALAcIms, supra note 8, at 257; see also HAMBLIN, IMPERATIVES,
supra note 8, at 229-32.
28 See HAMBLIN, ImPEmRATrEs, supra note 8, at 229.
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In persuasion dialogue, the participants must be fairly free to re-
tract commitments if they wish to do so without penalty. By contrast,
in the inquiry type of dialogue the participants are not generally free
to retract commitments as the dialogue goes along. Indeed, the cen-
tral purpose of the inquiry is to verify a commitment by very strong
evidence, so that, in principle, there should never be any need to re-
tract a proposition. The goal of the inquiry is to prove that a particu-
lar proposition is true (or false), or alternatively, to prove that it
cannot be proved as true (or false). The defining characteristic of
argumentation in the inquiry is the property of cumulativeness, mean-
ing that once a proposition is accepted as "verified," or "established"
as true at any point in the inquiry, it is never retracted at any suc-
ceeding point. The inquiry can be modeled as a tree structure where
the nodes in the tree represent "evidential situations," or points at
which sets of propositions are verified. 29 As argumentation proceeds
up the tree, from its root along a branch, the set of propositions that
are verified gets larger and larger, but none of the propositions are
ever retracted.
The inquiry is an ideal model of reasoned argumentation, but a
lot of people ask at this point whether scientific argumentation is (or
should be) an inquiry. Those philosophers, like Pascal and Descartes
(Enlightenment guys) who answer yes to this question are called
foundationalists. The foundationalist view of scientific research was
popular, not to say dominant, during the time of logical positivism.
But this view has been under severe attack by postmodernist thinkers
for some time, and it does not seem to be as widely accepted as it once
was.
Euclidean geometry is a good example of scientific argumenta-
tion that has been cast into the format of an inquiry. Conclusions
drawn can only be based on axioms, or premises already proved as
following from these axioms by the truth-preserving rules of inference
(deductively valid rules). An example of an empirical inquiry would
be an official government investigation into an air disaster, where the
aim is to assemble all the relevant evidence, and draw only conclu-
sions that can be verified on the basis of this evidence. I understand
there are specific legal rules governing different kinds of official in-
quiries, and it would be an interesting project to study and classify
these different types of inquiry, using the inquiry type of dialogue
structure as a model.
29 See Saul Kripke, Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I, in FORMAL SYSTEMS
AND RncuRsiv- FUNCTIONS 92-113 (J.N. Crossley & M. Dummett eds., 1965).
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The purpose of negotiation dialogue is not to prove the truth of a
proposition, but to "make a deal" by trading off concessions so that
you can get what you want most, and the other party can get what it
wants most. The confrontation in the negotiation dialogue is set by a
conflict of interests between the two parties. There are some goods or
interests-normally financial in nature, but it could be something
else, like prestige, that is at stake-and neither party can have all these
interests to itself. So the argumentation pertains to the dividing up of
the interests. There is a large literature on negotiation, including a
journal exclusively devoted to it. It is not necessary to describe it fur-
ther here, except to warn the reader that the general aim and meth-
ods of arguments used in negotiation dialogue are distinctively
different from those of persuasion dialogue, even though the same
types of arguments are used in both types of dialogue.
The goal of information-seeking dialogue is the transfer of some
information from the one party to the other. One familiar kind of
example is the celebrity interview, where an interviewer asks a celeb-
rity questions designed to reveal information that would be of interest
to the viewers. Another kind of information-seeking dialogue that is
becoming more and more familiar to all of us is that of using a com-
puter retrieval system to search through a data base. Even though one
participant is a computer program, the sequence of questions and re-
plies can insightfully be viewed as what we call a type of dialogue.
Computer science is now in fact following this usage, where a software
program is described as an "agent" that can engage in different kinds
of dialogue, like negotiation, with a user of the system. This branch of
"Artificial Intelligence" (AI) is called argumentation in multi-agent
systems.30
While persuasion dialogue is directed towards finding out
whether a proposition is true or not, deliberation is directed towards
actions and its purpose is to find the most prudent course of action
from a given set of choices available in a particular situation. The
confrontation stage of deliberation is set by a dilemma, a given situa-
tion in which only two (or some small number) of choices of how to
proceed are available, and the agent has to decide to take the one
option or the other. The kind of reasoning typically used in a deliber-
ation is called practical reasoning, or what Aristotle called practical
wisdom (phronesis), which is a goal-directed, knowledge-based, action-
concluding kind of reasoning in which an agent is aware of its exter-
nal situation and the consequences of its actions as they affect that
30 See Michael Wooldridge & Nicholas R. Jennings, Intelligent Agents: Theory and
Practice, 10 Tim KNOvLEDGE ENGINEERING REVIEw 115-152 (1995).
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situation. Practical reasoning is a dynamic, case-based kind of reason-
ing that changes with incoming information, and typically uses defea-
sible argumentation of a kind that is subject to default occasionally.3'
Eristic dialogue is an agonistic or adversarial type of dialogue
where each party hits out at the other party, and tries to humiliate
them or make them look foolish or incompetent. The most familiar
subtype of eristic dialogue is the quarrel. In the quarrel, both parties
have deep grudges or complaints that they have harbored for a long
time, of a kind that would not be appropriate to express overtly in
normal, polite conversation. But then the quarrel suddenly "bursts
out" on some provocative occasion, and both sides "spill their feelings
out." Typically, the conversation lurches from one topic to another,
and the most common type of argumentation is the argumentum ad
hominem or personal attack. Relevance, of the kind necessary in a per-
suasion dialogue for example, is not much in evidence in the quarrel.
A domestic quarrel, for example, may start out with a dispute about
one party's failure to take out the garbage, but then suddenly the sub-
ject may change to concentrate on some annoying mannerism of the
one party that is unrelated to the garbage issue.
Initially the quarrel doesn't seem to have anything to do with
logic at all, and modern logic has pretty well ignored it. But, the quar-
rel is extremely important in studying many of the informal fallacies,
such as in the ad hominem fallacy mentioned above. Both Plato and
Aristotle were very well aware of eristic dialogue and the importance
of it in studying sophistical reasoning. Both had a strong apprehen-
sion about the degeneration of what they called dialectical argument
(a productive kind of argumentation) into "antilogic"or sophistry,
representing a kind of counterproductive argumentation that can be
used to deceive people by virtue of its superficial resemblance to dia-
lectical argumentation. At any rate, eristic dialogue is an important
type of dialogue to be aware of, even if the lessons of it are mainly
negative.
The classification of dialogue into the six basic types cited above
is not, in any sense, complete. But starting with these six types, other
familiar kinds of dialogue exchanges where argumentation is used can
be classified as mixed types. For example, the forensic debate, of the
kind often organized by college debate teams, can be classified as a
mixture of persuasion dialogue and eristic dialogue, organized as a
contest, with rules and judges. Political debate, of the kind that takes
place in a legislature or parliament according to rules of procedure
31 See DAVID S. CLARKE, JR., PRACrICAL INFERENCES 3-6 (1985).
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moderated by the "speaker of the house," can be viewed as a kind of
persuasion dialogue that also has eristic elements.
Another phenomenon that is important to know about is the dia-
lectical shift, or change of context from one type of dialogue to another
during the same sequence of argumentation. For example, the mak-
ing of a threat during a persuasion dialogue (an inappropriate type of
move in that type of dialogue) may indicate a dialectical shift to a
negotiation type of dialogue. Dialectical shifts are indicated by lin-
guistic clues in the discourse in a case. Not all dialectical shifts are
illicit. For example, in a parliamentary debate, the dialogue may shift
from persuasion dialogue on some issue, like a debate on a particular
housing bill, to an information seeking type of dialogue, where infor-
mation about the current costs of housing is brought in. The shift in
this kind of case could help the persuasion dialogue by making it
more informed on the particulars of the issue.
III. RELEVANCE
One of the most important things about the pragmatic perspec-
tive on evaluating argumentation is that relevance of argumentation is
seen in a dialectical way. An argument is relevant if it contributes to
the realization of the goal of the dialogue of which it is supposed to be
part. Each type of dialogue has an issue posed at the confrontation
stage, and an argument is relevant in that type of dialogue if it bears
on that global issue. A corollary of this pragmatic way of defining rele-
vance has already been noted above. An argument can be relevant in
one type of dialogue, but might be irrelevant in another types of dia-
logue. For example, as observed above, an argument that appeals to a
threat might be relevant in a negotiation type of dialogue. But the
very same argument could be irrelevant if it is used in a persuasion
type of dialogue.
Traditionally relevance in logic was used as a wastebasket category
to dismiss an argument as "fallacious" when no other reason could be
found for rejecting the argument. But the problem was that relevance
was never really defined in a clear and useful way. The problem with
this approach is that if someone is accused of committing a fallacy of
relevance, say when using an ad hominem attack that does not really
bear on the issue, he can always claim it is relevant in some sense, where
relevant may mean something like "important to me."
But what is important for the purposes of applied logic is notjust
relevance, in such a broad and general sense, but a narrower prag-
matic notion of dialectical relevance, meaning that something is rele-
vant only if it contributes to a dialogue in which argumentation in a
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given case is taking place. In this dialectical sense, questions and
other moves can be judged to be relevant or irrelevant, as well as argu-
ments themselves, although very often it is arguments that one is cen-
trally concerned with.
Judging the relevance or irrelevance of an argument in a given
case is always conjectural and is a judgment that is very much a func-
tion of the dialectical context of a case. You have to get a grasp of how
an argument is being used in context, judging from what you know of
the context of the case. Of course, this context may not be completely
known, or it may not be known at all, in some cases. Typically, the
argument to be evaluated may be in midstream. So to judge whether
it is dialectically relevant or not, you (as a critic) have to try to extrapo-
late the argument forward, to estimate whether it has the potential to
bring forward some evidence that would support (or at least be part of
a proof that would prove or disprove) the claim on one side or the
other of the issue of the conflict of opinions that the dialogue seeks to
resolve.
In other words, the idea of dialectical relevance harks back to the
ancient idea of Hermagoras and classical stasis (or status) theory.3 2
The idea was that in a dialogue there is a global issue, a pair of pro-
positions that represents a conflict of opinions that is controversial. A
move in argument is relevant if it helps to resolve this conflict by bear-
ing on one or the other of the propositions at stake in the dialogue.
"Bearing on" means that it can be used to give weight of evidence
either for or against one of these propositions.
What do we mean when we say that to be dialectically relevant an
argument must "extrapolate forward" towards the goal of the global
issue of a dialogue? This notion of extrapolating forward can be
modeled using a commonplace technique in Al called "forward chain-
ing." Forward chaining is the linking together of a series of subinfer-
ences so that the conclusion of one inference also functions as a
premise in the next one. The resulting sequence of inferences can be
modeled using the technique of argument diagramming.3 3 A graph-
a kind of flow chart of the sequence of argumentation-is con-
structed. In a dialectically relevant argument, the last proposition in
the sequence is the arguer's thesis that was supposed to be proved in
the dialogue as a whole. Hence, dialectical relevance is a global and
contextual notion that is a function of how an argument is used in a
32 See MARcus FABius QUINTILANUS, INsTrrUTIo ORATORIA, vol. III, bk. VII, ch. 10
(H.E. Butler trans., Loeb Classical Library, Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
33 See DouGLAs N. WALTON, ARGUMENT STRUcruRE: A PRAGMATIC THEORY 78-108
(1996).
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given case to make the right sort of point that is supposed to be made
in that type of dialogue.
Already lawyers will wonder whether dialectical relevance in a
critical discussion is the same kind of relevance that figures so promi-
nently in the rules of evidence. In broad outline, it seems that the two
notions are comparable. In a critical discussion, an argument is rele-
vant if it can be used to support or detract from the plausibility of one
of the propositions at issue in the initial conflict of opinions. The
notion of relevance defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence34 initially
seems quite comparable, but when the exclusionary clauses are intro-
duced, these rules depart from dialectical relevance. But before com-
paring similarities and differences, some remarks need to be made
about the trial generally as a framework in which argumentation takes
place.
IV. T-n FAr TRIAL AND Tm WITcH HUNT
The hypothesis put forward here is that the argumentation used
in a fair trial is best modeled logically in the framework of the subtype
of persuasion dialogue known as the critical discussion. As noted
above, the goal of a critical discussion is to resolve a conflict of- opin-
ions by means of using logical reasoning that brings forward and tests
the strongest arguments on both sides. In persuasion dialogue gener-
ally, the dialogue can be successful even if the conflict is not resolved.
But in the legal trial, a forcing of the decision is effected by the initial
distribution of the burden of proof at the confrontation stage. What
provokes a trial, in our system, is an allegation that cannot be dealt
with in some process of dispute resolution other than a court. In a
criminal case, the standard of proof required is proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and this burden is placed on the prosecution. The
defense, to win, has only to put the prosecution's attempt to prove
into doubt. So the prosecution's proof either meets the standard or it
does not. If there are doubts, the proof of guilt is judged to fail.
Hence the system is designed to come to a conclusion, to resolve the
initial conflict of opinions one way or the other. So the trial is success-
ful only if it fulfills this goal. Otherwise it is a "mistrial."
It seems a reasonable hypothesis then that the fair trial can be
modeled as a critical discussion, a type of persuasion dialogue. There
are two sides, the prosecution, which has a thesis to be proved, and
the defense, which must oppose this attempt at proof. So far so good.
The trial does seem to be a kind of persuasion dialogue, in this re-
34 See infra Part V.
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spect. But in another key respect, the trial is different from the criti-
cal discussion. In a critical discussion, each of the two arguers tries to
persuade the other to accept his or her thesis. Their efforts at persua-
sion are directed at each other. But in a trial the two arguers aim
their efforts of persuasion at a third party-the trier-which may be a
jury or judge. So here is a fundamental difference between the per-
suasion dialogue generally and the fair trial. It is up to the jury to
decide the outcome in a trial. The opposing attorneys can, and
should, use any arguments that will persuade the jury to accept their
contentions, or at least use any arguments allowed as relevant, or not
otherwise excluded by the procedural rules as determined by the pre-
siding judge.
It seems then that while the trial does have some features of the
persuasion dialogue, it also has some distinctive features that make it
different from the model of the persuasion dialogue. The main dif-
ference is that there are three parties involved, not just two. The
other differences concern the way that the third party decides the out-
come. The jury deliberates, and then decides, on the basis of that
dialogue, which side won and which side lost the trial. Thus, the fair
trial is more complicated in some ways than the persuasion dialogue,
as it involves persuasion and much more.
The best way to come to understand the logical features of how
the fair trial should work as a normative framework in which argu-
ments are evaluated is to contrast it with an opposing normative struc-
ture of dialogue called the witch hunt. The witch hunt has ten
defining characteristics: 35
(1) pressure of social forces that drives the argumentation for-
ward powerfully;
(2) stigmatization of the accused, making a defense difficult or
even impossible;
(3) climate of fear;
(4) resemblance to a fair trial;
(5) use of simulated evidence (as opposed to real evidence);
(6) simulated expert testimony;
(7) nonfalsifiability characteristic of the simulated evidence;
(8) reversal of polarity (or shifting of burden of proof, meaning
in a criminal trial that the accused would have the burden
of proving his innocence);
35 See Douglas N. Walton, The Witch Hunt as a Structure of Argumentation, 10 ARGU-
MENTATION 389 (1996).
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(9) non-openness, meaning that the argumentation is one-
sided, and the prosecution argument is not really open to
refutation; and
(10) use of the loaded question technique.
These characteristics form a cluster of properties such that if
enough of them are present in a given case of a tribunal, the tribunal
may be classified as a witch hunt. Numbers (1), (2), and (3) are the
initial conditions that make the witch hunt possible. Number (4)
gives the procedure apparent legitimacy, and numbers (5), (6), and
(7) describe the "evidence" used to support the argumentation. In
the inquisitorial witch hunts in the middle ages, the accusation made
tended to be of a fuzzy kind, like "being in league with the devil," a
charge that is difficult or impossible to refute by empirical evidence.
But evidence to support the accusation was not hard to come up with.
Any kind of indicator, like being old or smelly or "weird" could be
used as evidence to support the accusation. Something called "spec-
tral evidence" was visible only to the accuser. Finally, numbers (8),
(9), and (10) are the methods used in the evaluation of the evidence
in the witch hunt.
The Inquisition is not really a single example of a witch hunt. It
is a kind of mythic concept that covered many (typically) religious
kinds of tribunals over many centuries in which heretics were pun-
ished on the grounds that they were non-believers in church orthodox
dogmas, going as far back as the fourth century. But many specific
witchcraft trials could be cited, including those in the European witch-
craze of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Other examples of
witch hunts that can be cited are the Salem Witchcraft trials of 1692
and the McCarthy tribunals of the 1950s. In all these cases, we have
what looks on the surface like a fair trial, but was in fact a kind of
pseudo-trial designed to support the interests of a well-organized
group who used the procedure as a method of enforcing adherence
to a cause riding on a groundswell of public enthusiasm and fear. By
forcing the accused to either "recant," "see the light," and become "re-
educated," or face a severe penalty, like being burned at the stake-or
nowadays, losing one's job-the witch hunt was used as a device to
influence the balance of power during a time of turbulent social
conflict.
In a fair trial the accusation-the charge to be proved or dis-
proved-must be of a kind that can be supported or refuted by real
evidence. So the notion of evidence is central to the idea of a fair
trial, and the fair trial must be an open sort of procedure that gives
both sides an opportunity to bring forward the relevant evidence to
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support its side. It must be open, in certain respects, and two-sided,
even though it should not be open to all arguments.
The fair trial can be thought of as a kind of persuasion dialogue
in which both the proponent and the respondent attorneys, the prose-
cution and defense, have a designated proposition they must prove to
win or be successful in the disputation. But there are a lot of other
rules and requirements laid over this underlying framework. What
both parties must use for this purpose is called "evidence" in law, and
that is defined by rules of evidence, which vary from place to place.
To sum up, the fair trial can be thought of in two ways. Positively,
it can be thought of as a kind of persuasion dialogue. But it is not
exactly the same as a persuasion dialogue, because there are three
distinctive parties involved. Negatively, the fair trial can be thought of
as not being a witch hunt. To put this characteristic in a positive way,
the fair trial must be an open and balanced forum for the introduc-
tion and evaluation of evidence where the defendant has a fair chance
to give evidence of a kind that could be used to show that the allega-
tions of the accuser are not supported by a strong enough argument
of the kind that should be needed to prove the accusation. The first
characteristic of the fair trial is that it involves the use of logical argu-
mentation in which the contentions of two sides are opposed. The
second characteristic is that there needs to be a forum in which both
arguments can be heard and fairly judged. The rights of both sides to
put forward the best case they can need to be respected. In particular,
the trial should notjust be an unbalanced witch hunt. The defendant
should have some real possibility of finding and presenting sufficient
evidence to persuade the trier that the contention of the other side
has not been proved.
V. EVIDENCE
What constitutes evidence depends on how the evidence is sup-
posedly being used to prove something for some purpose. Scientific
evidence is supposed to be reproducible, meaning that the observa-
tion or empirical data upon which the evidence was based should be
open to re-observation by a second party, who will then get the same
result that was reported in the first instance. Much legal and histori-
cal evidence is not of this type, but rather is based on the testimony of
a witness, often reporting a singular event, or in other words one that
cannot be repeated. So legal evidence and scientific evidence are dif-
ferent. But both are legal evidence in some broad sense of the word.
The common law of evidence has evolved into a set of rules for deter-
mining what constitutes legal evidence.
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What is (supposedly) scientific evidence can become legal evi-
dence, in a trial, but when looked at as legal evidence it is based on
expert testimony. There are (disputed) criteria that determine when
scientific evidence should count as legal evidence in a trial. In short
then, scientific evidence has inherently different criteria for what
should count as evidence than legal evidence, and both sets of criteria
are determined by the methods of argumentation in use in science or
law. But still, both are evidence in the sense that both kinds of argu-
mentation are based on a premise of some sort of presumed observa-
tional report of some finding and on inferences drawn from that
supposed finding. Both are evidence in a broad sense of that term.
The rules of legal evidence have evolved through a long tradition
in which Bentham and Wigmore were the two leading theorists.3 6
The culmination of this process is the set of rules currently used in the
United States. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), the
purpose of the FRE is "that the truth may be ascertained and proceed-
ingsjustly determined. v37 So the FRE has two goals. One is the deter-
mination of the truth. The other is the procedural fairness of that
determination. The second aspect dearly admits a pragmatic element
in the concept of legal evidence embodied in the FRE. These rules
are based broadly on a philosophy of common sense empricism in the
tradition of Locke, Bentham and Mill, reflected in the conception of
evidence of Wigmore. 38
Relevance in the FRE is defined in Rule 401, where "relevant evi-
dence" is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the exist-
ence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable than it would be without the evidence."3 9 The
"action" is the allegation being tested by the trial. It is the proposition
that is at issue in the trial, the proposition that is supposed to be
proved or not by the trial. So this definition of relevance appears to
be quite comparable to the basic notion of relevance in a critical dis-
cussion. But one question needs to be sorted out. What does "more
probable" mean?
The idea of probability here should be interpreted not in the
modem post-Enlightenment Pascalian sense of statistical probability,
but in an acceptance-based sense of plausibility.40 To say that a propo-
sition is plausible is to say that it seems to be true, based on some-
36 See WILLIAM TWlNING, THEORIES OF EvmENcE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 1-18
(1985).
37 FED. K. EvlD. 102.
38 See Twlm'G, supra note 36, at 109-67.
39 FED. R. Evm. 401.
40 See COHEN, supra note 7, at 2-4, 310-23.
IL998]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[O
body's impressions or supposed observations, or it is consistent with
other propositions that are accepted is plausible, or it has been tested
and supported by the outcome of the test. This criterion is essentially
that of Carneades (second century B.C.).41 This ancient idea of plau-
sibility has different properties from the statistical notion of
probability. To say that a proposition is plausible is to say that there is
some weight of evidence in favor of accepting it, a weight of evidence
that can be raised or lowered by new evidence that can come in. In-
ferences (deductive, inductive and presumptive) can be drawn from
plausible propositions used as premises. The general rule of plausible
reasoning advocated by Nicholas Rescher is the least plausible prem-
ise rule: in a deductively valid inference, the plausibility of the conclu-
sion should be brought up to the plausibility level of the least
plausible premise in the inference. 42 But whatever set of rules for
plausible reasoning are used-and in the field of AI, there are many
sets of such rules-plausible inference should be seen as representing
a kind of reasoning that is inherently different from deductive and
inductive reasoning. Different rules and standards of acceptance are
appropriate, because plausible reasoning is inherently presumptive in
nature, and its root notion of burden of proof is different from that of
the other two kinds of inference. By means of plausible reasoning, a
proposition is (tentatively) acceptable in a dialogue if one party in the
dialogue brings it forward as an assumption, and the other party does
not bring forward any evidence against it that would show that it
should not be accepted at this point in the dialogue. A plausible as-
sumption of this sort should always be regarded as open to defeat at
some future point in the dialogue, because new evidence could come
in that shows it is false. The burden of proof for such a proposition, it
should be noted, is distributed in a way that is inherently negative in
nature.
To reiterate then, according to the FRE, evidence is relevant if it
makes the "action" to be determined, the proposition that is supposed
to be proved (or disproved), more plausible or less plausible. This
definition seems quite similar to the idea of relevance in a critical dis-
cussion, of a kind that might take place in everyday argumentation
(outside the legal framework). But the similarity only goes so far. Ac-
cording to Rule 403 of the FRE, relevant evidence may be excluded "if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
41 See BENSON MATES, THE SKEPTIC WAY SExTus EMpIRcus's OUTLINES OF PYRRHO-
NISM (1996).
42 RESCHER, PLAUSIBLE REASONING, supra note 10.
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eration of undue delay."43 It is this excluding or "prophylactic" func-
tion of relevance in common law that makes this notion of relevance
seem suspicious to outside observers.44 What is evident is that the
legal notion of relevance in the FRE departs from the extra-legal no-
tion of relevance in the critical discussion by virtue of these special
legal rules of exclusion. It was Bentham who was most noted for his
advocacy of natural argumentation in law, and his opposition to "arti-
ficial" rules of exclusion that are used to bar evidence as "irrelevant."45
As more exclusionary rules are added in, the legal notion of relevance
comes to resemble the logical (dialectical) notion less and less, or to
depart from it more and more on what evidence is considered to be
relevant in a given case.
Still, there does seems to be a strong resemblance between the
concept of relevance in the critical discussion and the concept of rele-
vance in the legal trial. There is enough of a resemblance to en-
courage the hypothesis that the legal concept of relevance embodied
in the FRE is basically the same (at least, in its roots) as the concept of
relevance in the critical discussion type of dialogue outside the law.
From the viewpoint of those theorists who think that legal argumenta-
tion is basically the same, in its underlying structure, as the kind of
argumentation used in everyday extra-legal discourse, this hypothesis
is very encouraging. It suggests a new way of working out models of
inference for analyzing and evaluating legal argumentation that is
much more promising than the deductive and inductive models that
have dominated legal logic in the past.
VI. ARGUmENTATION SCHEMES
An important aspect of relevance is the determination of the pro-
bative value of an argument in relation to the general claim to be
proved in a case. At the initial stage of the presentation of the evi-
dence in a trial, for example, it may be hard to judge whether some
argument will turn out to be relevant in the end or not. Such a deter-
mination can be made only by projecting the argument forward, and
asking how it could be used in a longer chain of argumentation that
aims towards the claim to be proven, and affects its plausibility value.
What is important here is the probative function of the argument, and
how it could be used to prove something. Many different kinds of
arguments can have a probative function.
43 FED. R. Evm. 403.
44 See MJAN R. DAMAsKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 55 (1997).
45 See TWINING, supra note 36, at 47-52.
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In addition to the deductive and inductive types of inference usu-
ally featured in logic textbooks as representing the forms of argu-
ment, twenty-five so-called argumentation schemes or presumptive
forms of inference have been defined.46 Presumptive reasoning is a
form of argumentation that has to do with practical decisions in situa-
tions where exact knowledge is insufficient to yield a decisive solution
to the problem. Presumptive reasoning is based on burden of proof
in a dialogue and is a defeasible kind of reasoning that is open to
default and revision. The following list comprises the twenty-five pre-
sumptive argumentation schemes: 47
(1) argument from sign;
(2) argument from example;
(3) argument from verbal classification;
(4) argument from commitment;
(5) circumstantial argument against the person;
(6) argument from position to know;
(7) argument from expert opinion;
(8) argument from evidence to a hypothesis;
(9) argument from correlation to cause;
(10) argument from cause to effect;
(11) argument from consequences;
(12) argument from analogy;
(13) argument from waste;
(14) argument from popular opinion;
(15) ethotic argument;
(16) argument from bias;
(17) argument from an established rule;
(18) argument from precedent;
(19) argument from gradualism;
(20) causal slippery slope argument;
(21) precedent slippery slope argument;
(22) argument from vagueness of a verbal classification;
(23) argument from arbitrariness of a verbal classification;
(24) verbal slippery slope argument;
(25) full slippery slope argument.
This list is not meant to be complete. Many of these forms of
argument were recognized by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 48 and
they cited many other forms as well. Actually, the identification and
46 See DOUGLAS N. WALTON, ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES FOR PRESUMPTIVE REASON-
ING 46-110 (1996).
47 See id.
48 See PERELMAN & OLBREcHTs-TYrEcA, supra note 3, at 193-410.
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classification of these everyday types of argument, traditionally called
"topics"(topoi), goes back to Aristotle's Topics,49 a book on dialectical
argumentation that covers hundreds of these topics used in disputes.
But the first modern treatment of argumentation schemes to present
a useful account of these forms of argument was that of Arthur Has-
tings.50 An account that is both comprehensive and useful is that of
Manfred Kienpointner.51 These forms of argument are plausibilistic
in an ancient sense well known to Plato, Aristotle, and other philoso-
phers of antiquity.52 The word "probable," often used to describe this
kind of reasoning, is misleading ever since the advent of the science of
statistical reasoning. Plausible reasoning is default reasoning based
on generalizations concerning what is normally the case (subject to
exceptions) in a given situation.53 To say that something is plausible
means that it seems to be the case, and therefore that it can tentatively
be accepted as true because it has a weight of evidence in its favor.
But such a conclusion is warranted only provided that, in the larger
body of evidence available, there is no stronger weight of evidence
against accepting it. What has only recently been learned is that these
familiar kinds of plausibilistic inferences do have definite forms as
arguments.
It is not too difficult to see how these presumptive forms of infer-
ence are basic to evaluating everyday legal argumentation. For exam-
ple, argument from testimony is a subspecies of argument from
position to know. So is argument from expert opinion, another form
of argument that looms large in evidence law, and in argumentation
used in trials. The example of argument from expert opinion is typi-
cal of how these presumptive argumentation schemes work. Tradi-
tionally treated in logic textbooks as a fallacy, this form of argument is
best evaluated in a given case by examining the question-reply se-
quence of how the expert's expressed opinion was used in a dialogue
by a proponent to make a point to support her side of the case. What
is important is to know the right critical questions to ask, and to ob-
serve how or if they were asked and replied to in a given case. Lawyers
are already familiar with the argumentation skills needed for the suc-
49 ARSoT, TOPIcA (E.S. Forster transl., Loeb Classical Library, Harvard Univ.
Press 1939).
50 See Arthur C. Hastings, A Reformulation of the Modes of Reasoning in Argu-
mentation (1962) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file
with author).
51 See MANFRED KIENPOINTNER, ALLTAGSLOGIc (1992).
52 See Michael Gagarin, Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rheto7ic, in
PERSUASION: GREEK RHEroRic IN ACnON 46-68 (Ian Worthington ed., 1994).
53 See RESCHER, PLAUSIBLE REASONING, supra note 10.
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cessful cross-examination of an expert witness. The importance and
legitimacy of appeal to expert opinion has also been emphasized in
the use of expert systems in Al and the application of this technology
to all kinds of uses.
At any rate, enough has been said to indicate the importance of
presumptive reasoning and the need to evaluate it pragmatically in
law. Deductive and inductive reasoning have been so strongly empha-
sized in logic for over two thousand years that the pragmatic study of
presumptive reasoning has been given little serious attention at all.
VII. FALLACrEs
The traditional informal fallacies are arguments that are quite
often reasonable, as used both in legal contexts54 and in everyday ar-
gumentation, but tend to be arguments that are of a presumptive and
defeasible sort that can, in some cases, be abused. As noted above, the
fallacious argument has been used to subvert or block the goals of a
dialogue, instead of moving the dialogue forward. Prominent exam-
ples are the ad hominem, or argument against the person, the appeal to
expert opinion, and various appeals to emotion, like the appeal to
pity. These arguments can be reasonable and appropriate in some
cases in legal argumentation, while in other cases they are irrelevant.
In such cases, they can be powerfully distracting and prejudicial argu-
ments that ought not to be considered relevant, and, if they have been
used, need to be handled with care.
The whole branch of logic called informal fallacies needs to be
rethought, and the common kinds of arguments associated with falla-
cies need to be judged and analyzed in the pragmatic framework
sketched out above, as opposed to the traditional frameworks of de-
ductive and inductive logic. This field of fallacy study is very much
applicable to legal argumentation, and there is much work to be done
in this area. Not only the use of character in ad hominem argumenta-
tion, but also the whole topic of relevance and many other traditional
kinds of fallacies as well, need to be studied as they are used in legal
cases in trials. Expert testimony is an entire area requiring much
more work of a logical nature. The pragmatic evaluation of the ap-
peal to expert opinion as a type of argument is another area needing
attention.
Critical thinking textbooks of the kind used in the undergraduate
curricula in universities already use legal examples, and some law
schools already realize that skills of argumentation and logical reason-
54 See Kevin W. Saunders, Informal Fallacies in Legal Argumentation, 44 S.C. L. REV.
343 (1993).
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ing are central to the methodology of law as a discipline. But I think
an improvement can be made by joining together the teaching of
logic in these two curricula. Critical thinking textbooks could use
more legal examples, and for this purpose, a data base of interesting
legal cases illustrating problems of argument evaluation needs to be
built up. Students are often initially inclined to dismiss fallacies as
trivial errors. But legal case studies can show that fallacies and other
logical difficulties really are quite important in cases where a lot of
money is at stake. One side of the problem is that law schools do not
presently put a priority on logic. The other side is that university
courses on critical thinking cannot afford to specialize too much on
cases and examples that are mainly of interest to pre-law students.
Somehow this gap needs to filled by finding the right balance in how
logic is taught. The materials are there for solving the problem, but it
will require research on fallacies and legal reasoning, as well as im-
proving how these matters are taught. Robert Rodes' and Howard
Pospesel's new book55 is one big step towards these goals, but my argu-
ment is that extending their chapter on the pragmatics of disputation
in the direction indicated is another required step if legal practition-
ers are to be convinced that logic can be centrally useful to them.
55 RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 1.
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